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ABSTRACT
The occupation payments made by France to Nazi Germany between 1940 and 1944 represent one
of the largest recorded international transfers and contributed significantly to financing the overall
German war effort. Using a neoclassical growth model that incorporates essential features of the
occupied economy and the postwar stabilization, we assess the welfare costs of French policies that
funded payments to Germany. Occupation payments required a 16 percent reduction of consumption
for twenty years, with the draft of labor to Germany and wage and price controls adding substantially
to this burden. Vichy’s postwar debt overhang would have demanded large budget surpluses; but
inflation, which erupted after Liberation, reduced the debt well below its steady state level and
redistributed  the  adjustment  costs.    The  Marshall  Plan  played  only  a  minor  direct  role,  and
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“[Les  allemands]  ne  nous  ont  rien  enlevé  de  vive  force;  ils  ont  toujours  tout  acheté 




War finance has been studied by examining how available domestic resources 
were used by belligerents (Friedman, 1952, Ohanian, 1997).  Although incurring huge 
expenses, warring governments are usually assumed to attempt to minimize the welfare 
costs  on  behalf  of  their  population.    But,  how  does  a  vanquished  country  deliver 
resources to its occupier?  The collapse of the Third Republic left Berlin in control of a 
nearly  equally  powerful  industrial  economy.    To  finance  its  continuing  war  on  other 
fronts, the German government sought and secured a massive and, perhaps, unparalleled 
transfer of resources from France.  Yet, once they imposed huge occupation payments, 
the victors left the French to decide how to raise the funds and contend with passive and 
active resistance from the population.  This paper analyzes the policies employed by the 
collaborating  government  in  Vichy  to  supply  resources  to  the  Nazi  war  machine, 
measuring the welfare costs of wartime programs and postwar stabilization plans and 
assaying the reasons for their choices.  
French policy under occupation was framed by the nation’s experience in World 
War I.  Vichy’s finance ministers, like their wartime Republican predecessors, publicly 
claimed that they would avoid inflation, raising taxes and issuing bonds.  Abandoning the 
free  market,  Vichy  imposed  wage  and  price  controls,  rationing,  and  a  repression  of 
financial  institutions  and  markets  to  drive  funds  into  the  government  bond  market.  
Although  the  outlines  of  Vichy’s  fiscal  and  financial  policies  are  generally  known 
(Milward, 1970 and Margairaz and Bloch-Lainé, 1991), the effects of transferring over a 
                                                 
1 “The Germans never seized anything by brute force; they always paid properly, but they paid with the 
money that they stole from us.”  While financial transfers were the most important element in German 
exploitation, Arnoult, Inspecteur Général des Finances, overlooks the looting immediately after the French 
defeat that Hermann Göring gleefully promoted.   3  3 
quarter  of  annual  GDP  are  not  well  understood.    After  comparing  the  magnitude  of 
Vichy’s payment to other episodes of reparations and war finance, we examine how it 
was funded and employ a neoclassical growth model to assess the elements of Vichy’s 
policies and some alternatives.  We find that the burden imposed on the French economy 
caused it to shrink at a rapid pace, severely curtailing consumption.  Although Vichy 
intended to manage the postwar debt overhang with higher tax rates, the governments 
following  Liberation  allowed  rapid  inflation  to  slash  the  debt,  redistributing  the 
adjustment cost.  Higher taxes did not fund the debt but instead paid for expenditures 
associated with the rise of the welfare state. 
I. The Magnitude of Vichy’s Payments 
During World War II, the French economy became a vital part of the German war 
machine.    The  systematic  exploitation  of  occupied  countries  provided  important 
contributions to the Nazi state, aiding prosecution of the war and social peace at home 
(Götz, 2000).  Milward (1970) estimated that for the whole course of the war Germany 
was able to extract revenue from all occupied countries equal to 40 percent of the revenue 
it generated by its own taxation, and of this 42 percent came from France.   
Table  1  shows  the  total  payments  made  to  Germany  during  its  occupation  of 
France.  As explained in the next section, these payments represent the actual financial 
transfers to German authorities, rather than their accumulated credits in the Banque de 
France.  Seizures and requisitions, for which Vichy did not provide compensation to the 
victims, are excluded.
2  Even though the measure of GDP is fragile and an underestimate 
because of the substantial black market, the total of resources extracted by the Nazis is 
stunning.  Even in the partial first year of occupation, nearly 20 percent of GDP was 
                                                 
2 Milward (1970, pp. 82-3) estimates that German booty from France for 1940-1944 totaled 154 billion 
1938 francs, of which 52.4 billion francs were military equipment.  Most of this loot was seized in 1940, 
and more systematic policies of exploitation were deployed afterwards.   4  4 
transferred, rising to well over a third of GDP in 1941 and 1942.  The switch from the 
limited war of Blitzkrieg to a completely mobilized economy led to a higher level of 
exploitation in 1943 and 1944, another partial year of occupation.  
Table 1 
French Payments to Germany, 1940-1944 
 




Costs as a 
Share of GDP 
(percent) 
1939  433     
1940  419  81.6  19.5 
1941  392  144.3  36.8 
1942  424  156.7  36.9 
1943  493  273.6  55.5 
1944  739  206.3  27.9 
Source: Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud (1972) provide the GDP data, Milward 
(1970), p. 271 gives the French payments to Germany. 
 
How should the size of these payments be viewed?  Some idea of their magnitude 
can be assessed with two comparisons, the first relative to other war reparations and the 
second relative to the cost of war for belligerents.  Defeat in 1940 was the third French 
loss  in  a  modern  war  where  occupation  costs  or  reparations  were  imposed.    After 
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo and after the Franco-Prussian war, France was forced to 
pay reparations for occupation and the cost of the war to the victorious allies in 1815 and 
to the German Empire in 1871.  Table 2 shows the size and burden of these reparations.  
For  the  defeats  of  1815  and  1871,  the  initial  estimates  of  reparations  are  shown  as 
percentage of one year’s GDP.  Another measure of the burden assumes that reparations 
were  financed  wholly  by  foreign  loans  so  that  the  burden  becomes  the  debt  service 
(Cohen 1985).
3  Although the burdens in terms of one year’s GDP are high, the foreign 
debt  service  imposes  a  more  modest  burden,  which  is  optimal  in  the  sense  that  it 
smoothes the path of consumption (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).  The 1815 and 1871 
                                                 
3 The burden here is b = (r-n)D/(1+n)GDP where r is the interest rate, n is the growth rate and D is the total 
debt.     5  5 
reparations were paid in full and ahead of schedule by the French government, borrowing 
partly from abroad.  The postwar World War I German reparations were set much higher 
than  earlier  French  reparations.
4    However,  Germany  did  not  meet  its  reparations 
obligations and defaulted.  Given that Weimar Germany borrowed more additional funds 
than it repaid, the  effect was to reverse reparations, raising income and consumption 
(Schuker, 1988).   
Table 2 
A Comparison of War Reparations 
 





Share of Debt 
Service to 
GDP 
France 1815-1819  FF 1.65 to 1.95  18 to 21  1.2 to 1.4 
France 1871  FF 5.0  25  0.7 
Germany 1923-1931  DM 50  83  2.5 
Vichy 1940-44  FF 479  111  2.6 
Source: White (2001), Klug (1990)  and Table 1. 
 
Unlike  previous  reparations,  delivered  at  the  end  of  hostilities,  the  occupation 
costs imposed on defeated France in 1940 were open-ended; Hitler was adamant that he 
would only consider a peace treaty once the war was over.  For Vichy, the figure for 
French reparations is the total sum of reparations paid over the years of occupation; 479 
billion French francs is the sum of the real value of the payments.
5  The base year for 
comparing the indemnity to GDP and tax revenues is 1939, a year of relatively high 
employment; its use reduces the burden compared to the war years when national income 
was lower.  Favorable conditions, a long-term French growth rate of 2 percent and an 
interest  rate  of  4.4  percent---the  same  as  used  for  Germany---are  employed  here.  In 
                                                 
4 The Allied Reparations Commission set German reparations at 132 billion gold marks in May 1921.  
Reparations bonds were divided into three segments A, B, and C.  The A and B bonds were worth 50 
billion marks, but most experts believed that the C bonds would never be issued.  See Schuker (1988). 
5 INSEE’s (1966, Tableaux XXVIII, p. 405) retail price index is used to deflate Vichy’s indemnities.  These 
are official prices and probably understate inflation.  The official wholesale prices show even less sign of 
inflation and hence they were not used.   6  6 
contrast to 1815 or 1871 or post-World War I Germany, Vichy had no access to outside 
capital markets and hence did not have the option to finance its obligations with foreign 
loans,  but  as  a  measure  of  size,  potential  debt  service  reveals  that  France’s  burden 
matched Germany’s.  Of course, France made these payments; Germany did not.  As will 
be seen, the methods of payment proved “crushing,” reducing consumption far more than 
2.6 percent. 
Table 3 








Sources: Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Fisk (1922), Ferguson (1998), Goldin (1980), 
INSEE (1966), Patat and Lutfalla (1990), Toutain (1997). 
 
Vichy’s  methods  of  financing  occupation  payments  may  also  be  compared  to 
French finance during World War I, when she had access to foreign markets, and to 
American finance during both World Wars, which was dependent on domestic finance.   
Occupation  finance  for  1940-1944  differs  considerably  from  Republican  France’s 
financing of World War I, where most expenditure was covered by debt issues.  Although 
the American participation in World War I only began in 1917 and her total expenditures 
relative to GDP were less, the pattern of financing is similar to French finance in the 
Great War.  The strongest resemblance is between Vichy finance and the United States in 
World War II, although the United States was less reliant on money creation, utilizing 
taxes more heavily.  The similarity is strengthened by the fact that both Nazi-occupied 
France  and  the  Arsenal  of  Democracy  used  wage  and  price  controls,  rationing  and 
















Total Expenditure as Share 









Share Financed by Taxes  21  48  4  30 
Share Financed by Debt  70  31  83  36 
Share Financed by Money  9  21  13  34   7  7 
financial repression.  The signal difference is that the economy of Vichy France shrank, 
while the United States had a robust growth of output.
6 
 
II. The Occupation and German Demands 
Blitzkrieg against France began on May 10, 1940.  Its spectacular success led to 
the  resignation  of  the  French  government  and  the  appointment  of  Marshal  Philippe 
Pétain, as head of government.  Pétain sued for peace and signed an Armistice on June 
22, 1940.  Following the Armistice, nearly half of the two million French prisoners of 
war,  were  released.    The  remaining  POWs  provided  forced  labor  for  their  captors 
(Herbert, 1997).  Under the terms of the agreement, the French fleet was disarmed and 
the Republic was carved up.  France lost the departments of Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and the 
Moselle to the Reich, while the departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais were 
attached to occupied Belgium and a small zone around Mentone was given to Italy.  The 
remainder was divided into the Occupied Zone, under direct German control, and the 
Free  Zone.    Pétain  moved  the  government  to  Vichy  in  the  Free  Zone  where  the 
constitution  was  suspended  and  plenary  powers  were  granted  to  the  Marshal’s 
government, which retained an army of 100,000.  When Allied successes in North Africa 
revealed the military weakness of the Vichy regime, the Germans marched into the Free 
Zone in November 1942.  However, from almost the beginning, the government in Vichy 
retained control of economic policy, which was generally uniform across both zones, 
with laws subject to approval of German authorities when they were implemented in the 
Occupied Zone.   
                                                 
6 Liberman (1996) argued that Germany succeeded in mobilizing Western European resources because of 
its ability to engage collaborators and that the economic decline during occupation was not a result of 
passive or active resistance but a shortage of raw materials.   8  8 
The extraction of resources from France was driven by the changing needs of the 
Nazi war machine.  In the beginning, the policy of Blitzkrieg was designed for a rapid 
limited war that would not require a total mobilization of the German economy; thus 
integrating and mobilizing French industry was not essential to Hilter’s plans.  After an 
initial  period  of  looting  promoted  by  Hermann  Göring,  Nazi  policy  determined  that 
France would be de-industrialized with limited industries.  The return of France to an 
agricultural  economy  coincided  with  Pétain’s  atavistic  view  that  the  nation  could  be 
morally rejuvenated by a return to its true rural nature.  Yet, there were policy differences 
in the Nazi regime; and the German Foreign Office believed that France should provide 
more resources to the war effort, slowly engineering a shift in policy.  The long struggle 
between visionary goals of a de-industrialized France and the practical need to pursue the 
war was answered decisively when the Blitzkrieg ground to a halt in the Russian winter 
of early 1942 and Hitler was forced to accept a total economic mobilization of Germany 
and its satellites for war (Milward, 1970). 
German  demands  on  the  French  economy  followed  these  broad  policy  shifts.  
When the German Army first rolled through the Netherlands, Belgium and finally France, 
the Reichskreditkassen was created on May 3, 1940 to supply the armies of the Reich 
with an occupation currency, the Reichskreditkassenschein.  The German authorities had 
no desire for this money to spawn inflation in Germany.  The occupation currency could 
not be spent in Germany or exchanged against the Reichsmark, hoping to bottle up any 
inflationary pressure in France.  The Banque de France had to accept occupation notes 
and  redeem  then  in  francs,  charging  them  as  costs  of  occupation  to  the  French 
government
7.   
                                                 
7 In France, the Reichskreditkassenschein were gradually demonetized between April 30, 1941 and 
December 1, 1943 (Andrieu, 1990, p. 151).   9  9 
The  essential  question  of  what  the  exchange  rate  would  be  for  the  franc  was 
settled on May 20, when the rate between the franc and the Reichskreditkassenschein was 
proclaimed to be 20 to one. This exchange rate was later decreed to be the official rate 
between the Reichsmark and the franc.  It was a huge overvaluation for the Reichsmark.  
According to Milward (1970, p. 55), it was overvalued by 50 percent using the dollar-
franc and dollar-Reichsmark rates of June 1940 or 54 to 63 percent using the exchange 
rates against the pound in 1939.  Exchange rates for September 1, 1939 implied an even 
greater overvaluation (Andrieu, 1990, p. 148). French goods were therefore intended to 
be cheap for the occupying German army. 
  Once  France  was  defeated,  international  trade  between  the  Reich  and  the 
vanquished Republic was restructured with a bilateral clearing agreement based on the 
arrangements  that  Germany  had  engineered  with  Central  and  Southeastern  European 
countries  in  the  1930s.    Foreign  exchange  was  strictly  controlled  and  allocated  for 
government-approved imports.  In early thirties, the economies of these German trading 
partners were depressed.  Neal (1979) argued that these countries could stimulate their 
economies using the bilateral clearing agreements to run export surpluses with Germany 
in blocked marks or Sperrmarks.  If the central banks bought these marks from exporters, 
paying  out  domestic  currency  at  the  fixed  rate  of  exchange,  it  would  become  an 
expansionary  monetary  policy.    The  greater  the  export  surplus  and  the  higher  the 
exchange rate of the Sperrmarks, the more expansionary the policy.  Although costly by 
transferring resources and offering trade credit to Germany, these costs might easily be 
outweighed by an expansionary policy in a depressed economy that made productivity 
gains.  Ultimately, rising domestic prices would decrease the competitiveness of domestic 
goods  exported  to  the  German  market.    Hungary,  for  example,  used  its  bilateral   10  10 
agreement to reflate its economy; while in countries like Romania, central banks operated 
on a “waiting principle” and refused to buy blocked markets from exporters until requests 
for marks from domestic importers of German goods materialized. 
  France  followed  the  Hungarian  example.    Although  France  had  clearing 
agreements with other countries in the orbit of the Third Reich, Germany became its 
dominant trading partner.  At the end of 1943, France was a creditor to Germany, Norway 
and Italy for a total of 119.1 billion francs, with Germany accounting 118.8 billion francs.  
France had deficits with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain and 
Turkey for a total of 7.6 billion, for a net surplus of 111.4 billion (Bettelheim, 1946).
8   
The  transfer  of  resources  under  the  bilateral  clearing  agreement  was  modest 
compared to the occupation costs imposed on France.  Following the precedents of earlier 
wars, the Germans required the French to pay for the costs of occupation.  However, the 
charges  were  set  far  above  the  actual  cost  of  occupation,  providing  the  German 
authorities with considerable means to purchase war goods and other products in France.  
In the Armistice talks in late 1940, the French were stunned and protested when they 
were informed during the negotiations that they would be obliged to pay occupation costs 
of 20 million Reichsmarks or 400 million francs a day.  Added to these were indemnities 
paid  to  owners  of  property  occupied  by  the  German  army  and  compensation  for 
requisitions (Patat and Lutfalla, 1990, p. 98).   
According to the French negotiators contesting the occupation costs in 1940, the 
head  of  the  German  economic  delegation  Hans  Hemmen  “indicated  that  the  French 
money payments would be spent in France: but with that money the Germans will be able 
                                                 
8 Despite the obvious costs, Pierre Cathala, the French finance minister from 1942 to 1944 remained one of 
its fervent advocate of this regime. As late as December 14, 1943 Cathala claimed that Germany would one 
day repay its debts and meanwhile the clearing agreement guaranteed that the production would remain in 
France instead of being transferred to Germany (Cathala 1948, p. 237).   11  11 
to buy the whole of France.”  He justified the reparations by reminding the French of 
those imposed on Germany in the treaty of Versailles.  He acknowledged that: 
The payment demanded is very heavy, and Germany knows by experience 
how ruinous such charges are.  That is why the German government has 
seen this question from an economic point of view, since at the same time 
that it has demanded these payments from France, it has proposed to her 
an economic system which frees France from the anxiety of ruin. (quoted 
in Milward, 1970, p. 61).   
 
At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  French  real  GDP  per  capita  exceed  the  level  in 
Germany, and the Germans saw no reason why this difference should be sustained. The 
willingness of Vichy to collaborate with the Nazis reflected the rough consensus of the 
majority  of  the  French  political  class  that  cooperation  was  in  the  long-term  national 
interest.   Faced with Nazi ruthlessness and the threat to society on many levels, the 
French concluded like others in similar circumstances that collaboration was a lesser evil, 
permitting  a  peaceful  rather  than  a  violent  seizure  of  resources,  with  the  costs  of 
extraction kept quite low for the exploiter.
9  What Hemmen envisioned and the French 
ultimately accepted was that occupation costs would be paid by the creation of money in 
the  account  of  the  Reichscreditkassen  in  the  Banque  de  France.    If  Vichy  wished  to 
contain the inflationary potential of this policy, the government could issue bonds to the 
French public and sterilize the creation of francs
10. 
Funds  from  the  occupation  charges  initially  proved  greater  than  the  Germans 
could spend and accumulated as unspent credits (Banque de France, Comptes rendus, 
                                                 
9 Liberman (1996)  found that France contributed approximately half of the income extracted from 
Occupied Western Europe, although rates of exploitation were higher in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Norway. 
10 Milward (1970) has argued that there was a precedent for this policy, going back to 1911 secret 
agreements between the Banque and the government to provide rearmament credits.  Du Parquet (2005) 
describes this operation.  The Governor declared that the Banque was ready to make advances up to 200 
million francs and signed a secret convention for 3 billion francs of credit if war broke out.  This policy was 
renewed when the Second World War loomed. An agreement was signed on September 29, 1938, where 
the Banque would provide the government with advances of up to 25 billion francs in the event of war 
(Merigot and Coulbois, 1950).    12  12 
1941-1942), a consequence of the relatively limited war pursued by Hitler.  The rising 
unused credits and French protests, combined with an offer to exchange French shares in 
Polish and Balkan firms desired by the Reich, produced a new agreement on occupation 
costs.  In May 1941, they were lowered to 15 million Reichsmarks or 300 million francs 
per day.  This moderation of German demands came to an abrupt end when Blitzkrieg 
failed  to  deliver  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  Reich,  forcing  Hilter  to  begin  a  complete 
mobilization of the Germany economy for war.  The account of the Reichkreditskassen 
was quickly drained, and the occupation costs were raised to 25 million Reichsmarks or 
500 million francs a day on December 15, 1942.  In addition, the small Italian occupation 
zone was funded with a monthly payment of one billion French francs, which Germany 
demanded after the collapse of Italy in addition to arrears of 2.8 billion from a special 
payment of 3 billion francs (Milward, 1970). 
Occupation charges including bilateral trade credits, presented in Table 4, quickly 
overshadowed ordinary government expenditures, which were roughly cover by taxes.  In 
spite  of  the  shrinking  economy  and  inflation,  real  tax  revenue  was  nearly  constant 
between 1938 and 1944, ranging from 55 to 59 billion 1938 francs.  Alone, it constituted 
a rising burden on the smaller economy, accounting for 14 percent of official GDP in 
1938 and 1939, rising to 25 percent in 1943.  Taxes on capital and on personal incomes 
were all increased and the collection methods were improved.  For example, in January 
1942, the tax on agricultural profits was revised and the revenues rose from some 30 
million francs to over a billion for 1942 (Magairaz, 1991, p. 544).  In contrast to World 
War I, war profits were taxed from the beginning.     
 
 
   13  13 
Table 4 
How France Financed Germany’s Exploitation 
(billions of francs) 















1939  150.1     150.1  42.2  28.4  29.5 
1940  203.6  81.6  285.2  25.2  27.2  43.6 
1941  120.8  144.3  265.1  30.3  34.6  34.4 
1942  133.2  156.7  289.9  35.6  26.1  40.4 
1943  135.3  273.6  408.9  29.8  34.7  37.6 
1944  212.8  206.3  419.1  29.5  52.6  14.9 
Sources: INSEE (1966), Patat and Lutfalla (1990) and Milward (1970). 
   
Inflation was the “unacceptable” tax; and even when war loomed, in November 
1940,  the  inheritance  tax  was  cut  and  state  funding  for  secondary  schools  was  cut.  
Inflation, the Minister of Finance warned would endanger “private property so necessary 
to society and so useful to the state.” Most importantly, Vichy did not want to alienate the 
conservative  rentier  class.    In  1942,  the  French  government  engineered  a  major  tax 
reform to broaden the tax base (Institutions de la France nouvelle, 1942).  Before the 
reform, most revenue was derived by taxes on wages, companies and interest income, 
with agriculture, property and the liberal professions contributing modestly.  The reform 
increased the revenues from agriculture, eliminating exemptions; and indirect taxes were 
increased.  The tax rate on wages and salaries reached 16 percent, 21 percent for business 
profits, 24 percent for income for liberal professions, and between 30 and 41 percent for 
interest income (Nogaro, 1945, p. 86).  These higher taxes combined with the shock of 
defeat sharply reduced output.  The undervaluation of the franc created an incentive for 
producers to sell their goods to Germany.  The French government wanted to impose a 
hefty profits tax on exports but Germany resisted and a low rate was set (Milward, 1970, 
pp. 68-70.).   14  14 
 III. The “Politique de Circuit” and the Containment of Inflation 
Fearful of inflation and informed by their experience of the 1920s, the primary 
objective of Vichy’s policy makers was to protect the value of the franc as best they 
could while under the Nazi boot.  Thus, while the overvalued exchange rate and potential 
inflationary  impulse  from  the  occupation  charges  might  seem  to  have  offered  an 
opportunity to inflate and undermine exploitation of the French economy, it was regarded 
as an unacceptable policy.  Both Vichy finance ministers, Yves Bouthillier and Pierre 
Cathala,  concurred  and  the  later  termed  the  defense  of  the  franc  a  “national  duty” 
(Cathala, 1948, p. 65)  Bouthillier, like other officials, believed that an accommodating 
French  government  would  be  less  onerous  than  direct  German  administration.  
Ultimately, by controlling inflation he hoped to preserve a healthy, stable economy by the 
end of the war so that France would have a place in the new economic order of Europe.  
In April 1942, when he was appointed Minister of Finance, Pierre Cathala wondered 
whether it made sense to pursue a policy aiming at containing inflation.  He concluded 
that France would not benefit from an inflationary policy because war would prevent an 
increase in real production.  Inflation would further ruin bondholders and discredit the 
state (Cathala, 1948, pp. 63-64).  The governor of the Banque de France, Yves Bréart de 
Boisanger and a member of the French delegation to the armistice commission, conceded 
that  “I  constantly  forced  myself  not  to  view  the  occupation  charges  from  a  purely 
financial  point  of  view.    If  I  had  done  so,  I  would  have  soon  demanded  that  the 
government suspend payments.  I did not do so because I was convinced of the need to 
reconcile the two countries and I believed that it would be necessary not just to think in 
terms  of  solely  France’s  interest  but  it  would  be  tightly  tied  to  the  question  of  the 
economic organization of Europe.” (Magairaz, 2002, p. 51).   15  15 
Vichy’s policy to hold back inflation was known as the “politique de circuit.” 
Following the accord between the Banque de France and the French State of August 25, 
1940, the bank consented to provide advances to cover the cost of occupation up to a 
maximum of 85 billion francs (Banque de France, Compte Rendu, 1941, p. 12), which 
were then provided as credits to the Occupation in the Reichskreditkassen.  These limits 
were continually raised to meet the obligations of the government, even as the Banque de 
France sought to “sauvegarder la monnaie” (Banque de France, Compte Rendu, p. 17). 
To prevent the growing stock of currency issued to pay French suppliers from having its 
full inflationary effect, the government attempted to “close the circuit” by selling bonds 
to repay its liabilities to the Banque de France.  The Banque and Treasury officials thus 
nervously watched any leakages from the circuit, and financial regulation was designed 
to prevent leaks from springing. For the “politique de circuit” to succeed it had to ensure 
that there was a robust demand for government bonds and inflation did not erode the 
desirability of holding money.  From the very beginning in 1939, the experience of the 
First World War worried the authorities who sought to control inflation.  On November 
10, 1939, a law froze wages at their September 1, 1939 level (Merigot and Courbois, 
1950).  After the Armistice, the price and wage freeze was confirmed on June 20.  Price 
limits were revised on May 23, 1941, with wages increasing on average by 12 percent for 
men and 20 percent for women (Mitzakis 1945, pp. 80-81). In real terms, however, wages 
remained far from their pre-war level.  Mitzakis (1945) estimated that, by 1944, wages 
had risen on average by 60 percent whereas prices---excluding the black market---had 
officially grown by 150 percent. 
Price controls led to shortages and the French government instituted a system of 
rationing.  Under the law of August, 16 1940, comités d’organisation were set up to   16  16 
oversee the production and distribution of raw materials and provide a buffer against 
German demands.  General rationing began with decrees issued on September 12 and 13, 
1940, centralizing control of raw materials, rationing gasoline and luxuries, and largely 
eradicating the boundary between the occupied and free zones.  These policies naturally 
spurred the growth of the black market and tax evasion and increased the demand for 
currency.  As would be expected, price controls were less effective than wage controls, 
reducing consumption and allowing inflation via the market for uncontrolled goods and 
black markets.   
Adding  to  these  expected  difficulties,  the  German  armed  forces  and 
administration  paid  higher  wages  than  those  permitted  by  regulations  for  French 
companies  (Milward,  1970,  p.  63).    Higher  wages  in  Germany  also  led  to  a  small 
emigration; but more importantly, German needs for labor and goods partly undermined 
Vichy’s  wage  and  price  controls.    Furthermore,  the  drive  to  sell  bonds  and  channel 
savings into government securities reduced new capital formation.  Frustrated by their 
inability to meet all of its objectives, Vichy moved towards more of a command economy 
where scarce inputs and resources were allocated to specific industries.   
Central to Vichy’s “politique de circuit” was its need to sell bonds.  Many of the 
tools employed by the Republic were taken over and employed by Vichy.  Bonds were 
promoted with public campaigns, but perhaps more importantly a squeeze was put first 
on the credit markets and then on the capital markets.  Like other wartime governments 
and its republican predecessor, Vichy was fearful of the cost of the new debt and wanted 
to keep interest rates low.  The Banque de France reduced its key rates on January 3, 
1939 as war loomed.  The discount rate and the rate on 30 day advances were lowered to 
2 percent and the rate on advances against securities was cut to 3 percent.  The only   17  17 
change occurred on March 15, 1941, when the rates were set at 1.75  and 3 percent, 
remaining unchanged for the remainder of the occupation.  These three forms of credit 
did not play a significant role; discounts and advances in the Banque’s balance sheet 
declined or stagnated.  Open market operations, which had been legalized in June 1938, 
increased significantly (Banque de France, Compte Rendu 1941 p.9).  Although it was 
not explicit, the government’s goal, assisted by the Banque de France, appears to have 
been to keep the rentes at approximately 3 percent, as the supply of government securities 
mushroomed.  
To  ensure  that  yields  and  government  financing  costs  remained  low,  credit 
provided  by  financial  intermediaries  was  diverted  to  the  purchase  of  government 
securities.  The Banque de France aided this effort by using its network of branches to 
sell  subscriptions,  while  the  banks,  savings  banks,  and  the  Caisse  de  Depôts  et 
Consignations were pressured to buy bonds, with the result that their portfolios shifted 
away from commercial and mortgage credit to government bonds (Margairaz, 1991, p. 
25, 545-546).  According to the French finance minister Bouthillier (1951, p. 298), the 
main  banks  considered  themselves  be  agencies  of  the  French  Treasury  rather  than 
promoters of industry and commerce.  Both Bouthillier and his successor Cathala claimed 
after the war that neither the banks nor the public felt coerced to buy bonds because they 
believed in the strength of the French economy and the state.   
However, French financial institutions were, in fact, under enormous pressure.  
Upon  entering  Paris  in  1940,  the  Germans  created  a  special  unit,  the 
Devisenschutzkommando, which forced the banks to declare gold and foreign currencies 
reserves, as well as the accounts held in foreign banks, claims on foreigners and bonds 
and  stocks  denominated  in  a  foreign  currency.    The  German  military  administration   18  18 
appointed  Dr.  Carl  Schaeffer  commissioner  of  the  Banque  de  France  and  head  of  a 
committee supervising the French banking sector and gave him broad powers to regulate 
all transactions.  While French bankers were not subject to clearly defined rules (Andrieu, 
1990, p. 153), they deduced that holding a large portfolio of French bonds was expected.  
More  formal  regulations  were  imposed  by  the  law  of  June  13  and  14,  1941  that 
established  the  “organisation  de  la  profession  bancaire.”    Banks  were  to  place  their 
“surplus funds” in short-term bonds.  In 1938, these bonds had accounted for only a third 
of their portfolios; by the end of 1943, they accounted for 90 percent. Rationed consumer 
goods  and  the  lack  of  alternative  investment  opportunities  encouraged  the  public  to 
deposit funds in low interest bank and savings accounts.
11  To limit disintermediation 
created by the black market and tax evasion, the government sought to ensure that large 
transactions were made through the banking system.  Laws decreed on October 22, 1940, 
February 28, 1941, and November 17, 1941 required payments in excess of 3,000 francs 
to be made only by checks. 
Efforts to raise deposits of financial intermediaries that would then absorb more 
bonds were threatened by the approach of the Allies. Magairaz (2002) identified two 
“monetary crises.” First, in September 1942, bank deposits which had grown at same 
speed as currency slowed abruptly.  The second “crisis” erupted in September-October 
1943 after the Allies bombarded Nantes.  Bank deposits shrank, as the stock and black 
market gold and foreign currency markets boomed. The Banque de France stepped in 
with  open  market  operations  to  prevent  a  banking  panic  from  starting.    Monetary 
authorities  feared  that  these  crises  would  raise  velocity,  increasing  inflation  and 
undermining the “politique de circuit.” 
                                                 
11 To adjust to the rising price level, the Vichy twice raised the maximum deposits permitted on 
individual accounts in savings banks (Banque de France, Compte rendu 1941, p. 3).  
   19  19 
In general, the low interest policy of the “circuit” was successful in keeping the 
nominal yields for government bonds low.  Real rates were considerably lower.  Even at 
the official rates, which certainly are under-estimates, inflation ranged between 17 and 24 
percent for 1940-1944, implying very low real rates of interest. Consequently, the capital 
market boomed.  After languishing in the doldrums for all of the thirties, there was a 
surge of new issues beginning in 1941.  Both private firms and the government took 
advantage of these circumstances to lower the rate on long-term debts and consolidate 
short-term debts.  The government alone issued 46.4 billion francs, of which only 9.8 
billion represented new medium and long term notes (Banque de France, Compte rendu, 
1941).  
To the consternation of the Vichy and German authorities, this low interest policy 
produced a boom in the stock market, which was controlled by a squeeze on equities 
(Oosterlinck,  2003).
12    As  inflation  rose,  investors  attempted  to  escape  the  effects  of 
inflation by investing in real assets and securities, which entitled them to hold real assets 
that presumably would not be diminished in value by the end of the war.  Capital and 
stock market controls were thus an essential part of the fiscal regime of occupied France.  
Shuttered when the Germans marched into Paris, the German authorities were reluctant to 
reopen the stock market, fearing that it would serve as a political barometer.
13 The French 
government countered that without a proper exchange to trade bonds, payment of the 
occupation charges would be difficult.
14  While the exchange was allowed to open on 
October  14,  1940,  the  Germans  set  strict  conditions.    Trading  in  stocks  and  foreign 
                                                 
12Crédit industriel et commercial increased its capital by the issue of new shares for cash, raising it from 
100 to 200 million francs in May 1941.  The Banque nationale pour le commerce et l’industrie (BNCI) 
which increased from 175 to 350 million francs, while the Société générale at the end of 1942 increased its 
capital  from 650 to 750 million francs.  In 1943 Crédit Lyonnais raised its capital from 400 million to a 
billion francs and augmented its reserves. (Plessis and Verheyde, 2003 , p. 20). 
13 “Vortragsnotiz betreffende die Wiedereöffnung der Pariser Börse,” August 18, 1940, AJ40 vol. 832 4b. 
14 Ministère des finances, “Note sur l’overture de la bourse,” August 10, 1940, A140 Vol. 832 4b.   20  20 
securities was forbidden as were all futures markets.
15  To induce investors to buy bonds, 
a capital gains tax of 33 percent for equities and foreign bonds held less than one year 
was imposed (later reduced to 20 percent and three months); the basic tax on coupons and 
dividends was set at 30 percent and soon a 5 percent tax on the purchase of all, except 
fixed-income securities, was added.  To monitor transactions, the market was centralized 
under a new institution, the Caisse Centrale des Dépôts et Virements de Titres, and new 
issues could not be bearer bonds, the then predominant form, but nominative bonds.   
For  five  months,  only  the  bond  market  was  open  in  Paris,  encouraging  new 
investment in bonds and making it easier for the French government to float bonds. There 
may have been little enthusiasm in Vichy for the reopening of the stock market, but the 
growth of a black market in stocks and pressure by brokers persuaded the government to 
permit stock trading again on March 19, 1941.  To prevent equities from detracting from 
the  government  bond  market,  decrees  issued  in  February  and  March  of  1941  limited 
dividends  to  a  maximum  of  the  three  year  pre-war  high  or  six  percent.  New  public 
offerings were not initially suppressed, but they were allowed only a maximum dividend 
rate of 8 percent.  Daily price increases were limited to 3 percent (decreases to 6 percent); 
in April, a tighter regime was imposed with a daily ceiling for price increases of 1 percent 
(decreases to 3 percent).  When these measures did not yield the expected results, the 
German  authorities  sold  formerly  Jewish-owned  securities  to  drive  prices  down  and 
threatened to close the exchange if prices kept rising.  However, the government could 
not  suppress  the  equities  market  as  new  investment  was  required  to  re-equip  French 
industry so that it could provide for the Nazi war machine.  This problem became more 
                                                 
15 The exchanges located in the Free Zone were not subject to these rules.  The result was a shift of trading 
to the Free Zone exchanges, primarily Lyon and the emergence of a large black market in the Occupied 
Zone.   21  21 
acute  after  1942,  when  the  French  economy  became  integrated  in  Speer’s  economic 
plans. 
 
IV. The Draft of Civilian Labor to Germany 
France’s capacity to pay was reduced further by the extraction of labor.  As early 
as 1940, German officials debated whether labor should be used in France or be drafted 
to  work  in  Germany.    As  long  as  the  Blitzkrieg  was  successful,  the  status  quo  was 
maintained: French POWs labored in Germany and only minor attempts were made to 
recruit  additional  foreign  workers  (Herbert,  1997).    After  the  failure  of  Blitzkrieg  in 
Russia, Albert Speer, the new Minister of Munitions set up the administrative machinery 
for controlling German production in France.  To increase labor utilization, Fritz Sauckel 
was made General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor.  Even though he was 
officially under Speer’s supervision, Sauckel was directly subordinate to Hitler (Herbert, 
1997, p. 163).  Sauckel set up an ambitious recruitment program in April 1942, which 
was intended to bring quickly an additional 150,000 skilled French workers to Germany. 
On May 6, 1942, Hitler ordered conscription to begin and insisted that the French 
would be paid less than German workers.  Believing that labor would be more efficiently 
used in Germany, Sauckel pressured Vichy.  Laval responded with a dramatic offer of a 
“relève” to exchange French workmen for prisoners of war in Germany, with the idea of 
returning a prisoner for every three workers to stave off a compulsory draft.  On June 6, 
Hitler agreed to replace 50,000 POWs with 150,000 French civilian workers.  The relève 
was announced by Laval on June 22, 1942 in a radio address, where he hinted at dreadful 
consequences if workers did not respond.  Workers were to be combed out by special 
committees established for that purpose and sent off to Germany.  On September 4, 1942,   22  22 
a compulsory labor decree established that all men 18 to 50 and all unmarried women, 
ages 21 to 35 who worked less than 30 hours were liable for conscription, although the 
families of those who left voluntarily would receive one-half their nominal wage plus 
remittances from Germany.   
Table 5 
French POWs and Civilian Workers in Germany, 1939-1944 
 
  May 1939  September 1941  November 1942  Fall 1943  August 1944 
French Civilian  
Workers in Germany 
6,669  48,567  134,518  649,000  654,782 
POWs  None  952,000  931,000  739,000  599,967 
TOTAL  6,669  1,000,567  1,065,518  1,388,000  1,254,749 
Source: Herbert (1997), except for 1943, Liberman (2001). 
 
These efforts did not satisfy the Germans and, in response, to pressure, Vichy 
established the Service du Travail Obligatoire or compulsory labor service on February 
16, 1943, where all men born between January 1, 1920 and December 31, 1922 were 
liable  for  two  years  service.    This  coercive  approach  eventually  convinced  many 
Frenchmen to join the resistance.  In August 1944, Sauckel decided to launch a new 
recruitment campaign, which led to a direct confrontation with Speer, as it was obvious 
that  production  in  French  factories  could  not  be  increased  while  transferring  French 
workers to Germany.  Speer managed to limit the transfer of French workers by creating 
“Speer plants”, whose workers were protected from conscription (Herbert, 1997, p. 275).  
Nonetheless, the number of Frenchmen working in Germany rose after 1942 as seen in 
Table 5.  In 1943, they represented 1.4 million workers, a reduction of about 10 percent 
of the French labor force.
16  
                                                 
16 Surveys made by the Germans during the war showed that the productivity level of French workers was 
usually between 80 and 100% of its German equivalent and far above the productivity of workers drafted 
from other countries (Herbert, 1997, p. 305).  This should however be taken with caution since racist   23  23 
   
V. Model and Data 
The  rapid  decline  in  French  GDP,  even  with  a  substantial  unmeasured  black 
market, suggests that a huge burden was imposed on the economy.  To assess the Vichy’s 
policies and alternate strategies, we begin with Ohanian’s (1997) and  McGrattan and 
Ohanian’s (2003) basic model of a wartime economy. We expand our version of this 
neoclassical growth model to include financial assets and allow for wartime controls. 
  In our model, there are a large number of identical, infinitely-lived households, 
competitive firms owned by households, and a government. There is no uncertainty, and 
all agents have perfect foresight. There is a single non-durable good, which is produced 
with capital and labor and is used for consumption and investment. The two financial 
assets are money and one-period government bonds. 
  Households own capital and make all investment decisions. Capital depreciates at 
the rate ￿, 0<￿<1. Households are endowed with one unit of time per period, which can 
be spent for leisure lt or labor nt. However, to account for the POWs and the labor drafted 
to work in Germany, we assume that the labor available is lowered exogenously by dt 
hours, so the time constraint is nt+lt=1-dt. 
  The household lifetime utility function is
17: 




t u(ct,Mt+1/Pt,lt)        0<￿<1 
which depends on consumption ct, real cash balances Mt+1/Pt, and leisure lt.  For the 
period utility function u, we adopt the functional form: 
                                                                                                                                                 
motives certainly influenced the results of the German surveys.  For 1939-1945, the French labor force was 
further depleted by deaths and invalids which were estimated to be respectively 200,000 and 230,000 for 
the military, 150,000 and 127,000 for the civilian population and for the deported 650,000 and 585,000.  
Bettleheim’s  (1946) older estimate places the total at 964,000. 
17 The money-in-the-utility-function assumption allows for a interest rate elastic money demand and is 
equivalent to other formulations; see Feenstra (1986).   24  24 
(2)    u = a ln(ct) + (1-a) ln(mt) + ￿ lt
1-￿ / (1-￿)  0<a<1, ￿>0, ￿>0, ￿￿ 1 
where the last term becomes ￿ ln(lt) in the case that the labor supply elasticty ￿ takes the 
benchmark  value  of  one.  This  functional  form  implies  that  consumption  and  labor 
decisions  are  independent  of  the  households’  portfolio  decisions,  and  money  is 
superneutral (Walsh, 2003). 
  Households begin period t with kt units of capital, Bt units of government bonds 
and Mt units of money. They rent out labor and capital at the wage and rental rates Wt, 
and Qt, and receive profits Zt and the bonds revenue (1+rt) Bt. They use this income to 
pay taxes, purchase goods for consumption, investment and net exports at the price Pt, 
invest in new government bonds, and modify their cash balances. Their budget constraint 
is then: 
(3)  (1-￿nt) Wt nt + (1–￿kt) Qt kt + Zt + [1 + rt (1–￿bt)] Bt = 
        Pt ct + Pt [kt+1 - (1-￿) kt] + Pt nxt + Tt + Bt+1 + Mt+1 - Mt 
where ￿nt, ￿kt and ￿bt are respectively the tax rates on income from labor, capital and 
bonds, and Tt are lump-sum taxes. Equation 3 states that income is composed of after-tax 
labor income (1-￿nt) Wt nt , after tax capital income (1-￿kt) Qt kt, profits Zt (in the flexible 
price  competitive  equilibrium  Zt  =  0),  and  the  bond  revenue  (principal  and  after-tax 
interest). This income is used for consumption Pt ct, investment gross of depreciation Pt 
[kt+1 - (1-￿) kt], net exports Pt nxt, lump-sum taxes Tt, investment in new bonds Bt+1, and 
increases in cash balances Mt+1 - Mt. 
  The households’ optimization problem is to maximize their lifetime utility subject 
to the previous time and budget constraints, and transversality conditions requiring that 
the present discounted values of future bonds and money converge to zero in the limit.   25  25 
Firms rent labor and capital, and produce consumption and investment goods with the 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(4)          yt = kt
￿ (Atnt)
1-￿        0<￿<1 
where the labor-augmenting technology At grows at the constant rate gamma. Firms act 
competitively to maximize profits Zt = Ptyt - Wtnt - Qtkt.  
  The government sets public consumption gt, taxes, bonds and money satisfying 
the period budget constraints: 
(5)    Pt gt + (1+rt) Bt = ￿nt Wt nt + ￿kt Qt kt + ￿bt rt Bt + Tt + Bt+1 + Mt+1 - Mt 
which state that expenditures for goods and payments for bonds (principal and interest) 
must be financed with taxes on labor, capital and bonds, lump-sum taxes, issues of new 
bonds  and  seigniorage.  A  consequence  of  the  transversality  conditions  is  that,  in 
equilibrium, the present discounted value of all government expenditures is equal to the 
present discounted value of all government revenues. 
  The equilibrium condition for the goods market is: 
(6)        yt = ct + [kt+1 - (1-￿) kt] + nxt+ gt. 
which states that the aggregate goods supply is equal to the aggregate goods demand for 
private consumption, investment, net exports and government expenditure. 
  The  values  for  the  labor  drafted  to  Germany,  tax  rates,  lump-sum  taxes, 
government expenditure and net exports are treated as exogenously determined, as are the 
initial values for capital, bonds and money. A competitive equilibrium is, then, a set of 
sequences of quantities and prices such that: given prices, households and firms solve 
their optimization problems; the government’s period budget constraints are satisfied; and 
the  labor,  capital,  goods  and  bonds  markets  clear.    It  is  easy  to  show  that  the   26  26 
government’s  period  budget  constraints  follow  from  the  other  equilibrium  conditions 
(Walras’ Law). 
    To  model  the  wage  controls  imposed  during  the  war,  we  also  introduce  the 
following alternative equilibrium, where ￿ represents the share of the economy subject to 
wage and price controls.  In each war year, the real wage is equal to a weighted average 
of the exogenously controlled wage and the wage that would clear the labor market in 
that year if there were no real wage controls, with the weights respectively equal to ￿ and 
1-￿. While labor supply is determined by the households, labor demand is set by firms 
subject to an additional rationing constraint in wartime, requiring their labor demand not 
to be larger than average (per firm) labor supply.  By the manipulation of wage and price 
controls, the wartime government exogenously affects the real wage, leaving households 
to decide on how much labor to supply. 
One key feature of wartime finance we do not attempt to model is the financial 
repression that permitted the Banque de France to maintain pegged nominal interest rates 
on government securities, which yielded highly negative real yields.  In our model, a 
huge  wedge  would  have  to  exist  between  government  bonds  and  other  financial 
instruments,  otherwise  they  would  not  be  held.    Essentially  by  compelling  financial 
institutions to fill their portfolios with bonds and placing restrictions on the stock market, 
Vichy  was  able  to  fix  the  price  of  government  securities  and  to  some  extent  the 
quantities.
18 
  After normalizing all nominal variables by the price level, we solve the system of 
nonlinear equations describing the equilibrium using the shooting algorithm described in 
Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004).  To begin the calibration, we require information not only 
                                                 
18 Makinen and Woodwar (1990) describe the results of pursuing a similar policy after World War I.   27  27 
on the initial state of the economy at the outset of the war and the wartime path of the 
variables, but also on the steady state variables.  The selection of the parameters for the 
latter is not a trivial exercise, as it should reflect what policy makers thought would be 
the long-term path of the economy when they made wartime financial decisions.  First, 
there  is  the  question  of  the  underlying  growth  rate  of  the  economy.    Growth  in  the 
interwar years was highly uneven; however from the late nineteenth century to 1929 and 
during the postwar World War II period it was approximately 2 percent, the value we 
adopt here for the steady state growth rate.
19  This is the long-term rate that policy makers 
would have optimistically hoped to see in the postwar period.  The length of a period in 
the model is one year, and we set the preference discount factor ￿ equal to .98, which 
implies a 2 percent preference discount rate and, given the 2 percent growth rate of the 
economy, a 4 percent steady state real interest rate. 
The outbreak of the war and its attendant shocks drove the economy far from its 
steady state values.  The wartime values for our exercise, from 1939 military build up to 
1944, were obtained from a variety of sources.  We used Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud’s 
(1975) estimates of GDP as they are the only source to provide wartime figures.  There is 
no data on aggregate wartime consumption and investment, although qualitative evidence 
points to vary large declines in these components.
20 
                                                 
19 The standard authority Carre, Dubois and Malinvaud (1975, p. 21) give the growth rates of GDP for 
1896-1913 as 1.9%, for 1913-1929 as 1.7%, 1929-1938 -0.4 percent and 1938-1949 as 0.9.  Over 1896-
1929, it was 1.8%, and for 1929-1963, 2.2%.  More recently Dormais (2004) finds the growth rate of GDP 
for 1900-1913 as 1.63% and for 1973-1998 as 2.1%.    
20 INSEE (1966, p. 553) estimated that GNP was 446 billion current francs in 1938, with consumption 
accounting for 74.2 percent, government consumption 12.7 percent, gross fixed capital formation 13.2 
percent, and exports and imports at 10.8 and 11.0 percent of GDP.  More recently, in a reexamination of the 
data  for  1935-1938,  Toutain  (1997.  p.15,  58  85)  apportions  74.3  percent  of  national  income  to 
consumption, 12.9 percent to government consumption, 15.6 percent to gross domestic capital formation, 
and 1.3 percent to government capital formation, with exports and imports accounting for 7.0 and 11.1 
percent respectively.     28  28 
  Only  postwar  data  is  available  to  set  the  parameter  values  for  the  production 
function.  Using the years 1938 and 1949-1958 provided by INSEE (1966), the factor 
shares are fairly stable and these are taken to represent their steady state values.  For 
1938, labor earned 67.7 percent of national income and for 1949-1958 it ranged between 
66 and 68 percent; hence 67 percent is selected. Consequently, the parameter ￿, capital’s 
share of total output, is set at 0.33.  The depreciation rate, ￿, is 10 percent, a number that 
makes the observed postwar capital-output ratio consistent with the steady state capital-
output ratio implied by the model. This depreciation rate is very close to the 10.6 percent 
found by INSEE (1966).  There were large changes in factor shares during World War II, 
as documented by Piketty (2001).  His factor shares closely match INSEE’s estimates, 
with  labor’s  portion  climbing  from  70  percent  in  1940  to  87  percent  in  1943  before 
drifting back to approximately 68 percent. 
For the steady state, we assume small government fin-de-siècle values for the 
ratio of  government  expenditure to GDP and tax rates.  Before the First World War 
(1911-1913), the share of government was about 10 percent (INSEE, 1966).  After the 
postwar stabilization, in the good years of 1927-1931, it was 14 percent, although this 
higher  level  still  contained  some  World  War  I  costs,  notably  veterans’  benefits  and 
interest payments.  The share of government jumped after World War II, reflecting the 
appearance of the modern welfare state.  Choosing a higher value from this period for the 
steady  state  seemed  inappropriate  as  it  is  unlikely  that  Vichy  officials  would  have 
anticipated or sought this increase.  Their goal was closer to a restoration of the pre-
World War I period, and thus we set the value for government expenditure to national 
income at 10 percent, which is also close to what would have been attained once the   29  29 
effects  of  the  First  World  War  had  disappeared.
21    We  assume  that  government 
expenditures were exogenously determined during the Second World War, consisting of 
the very limited conventional expenditures of Vichy plus the required transfers to the 
Nazis.   The Germans used the funds in their account at the Banque de France to purchase 
goods in France as their war effort required.   They were not interested in some nominal 
level of transfer but in obtaining real resources.  To set what they extracted in the model, 
we fix the ratio of actual government expenditures to the steady state GDP.    The use of 
official wartime output would be somewhat misleading as this omits the black market, 
which should have figured in the Nazis calculations, as they probably thought of what 
they could obtain in terms of the some steady state GDP. 
Although it would be preferable to have marginal tax rates, average tax rates are 
employed here in the absence of a thorough study of the tax structure and its incidence.  
Tax rates on labor and capital are imputed by taking the total tax revenues levied on each 
factor divided by their share of national income.  Based on data from Piketty (2001) and 
INSEE (1966), we estimate that in 1913 the tax rates were 11 percent for labor and 10 
percent for capital, yielding a small budget surplus.  For the period from 1930-1938, the 
tax rates for labor and capital were estimated to be 14 and 11 percent.  We selected the 
pre-World War I tax rates because, as in the case of government spending, it probably 
represented the government’s long-term objective.  As will be seen in our calibrations, 
the estimated sustainable debt in the steady state for these values is close the observed 
debt  at  the  outset  of  the  war.  To  obtain  the  wartime  tax  rates,  Piketty’s  (2001a) 
decomposition of the state’s revenue into taxes levied on capital, labor and mixed sources 
and INSEE’s data are employed, splitting the mixed revenues between capital and labor.  
                                                 
21 We ignore local government expenditure, which are harder to track, and are effectively assumed to be 
local lump-sum taxes with local transfers.   30  30 
The combined effects of the rise in wartime tax rates and the fall in capital’s share of 
income led the tax rate on capital to rise from 11.8 percent in 1938 to a peak of 59.8 
percent in 1943, while the tax rate on labor increased to 16.0 percent. 
  INSEE (1966) gives the total nominal debt of the central government.  In 1939, it 
stood at 423 billion francs, climbing to 1334 billion by the end of the war.  The debt to 
GDP ratio thus rose from 0.98 to 2.16.  The steady state for the French economy was 
considerably lower.  Bordo and Hautcoeur (2003) find the debt to GDP ratio to be about 
.80 in 1910 and falling to nearly .70 at the beginning of World War I.  After the postwar 
stabilization this ratio returned to .80 in 1930. 
We view the steady state exchange rate regime to be the gold standard, although it 
is not explicitly modeled.  Until the break up of the Bretton Woods System, the French 
ideal exchange rate regime was the gold standard; and the Vichy government, like its 
interwar  predecessors  and  postwar  successors  sought  its  return  (Bordo,  Simard,  and 
White, 1995).  We approximate a steady-state gold standard equilibrium by setting net 
exports equal and inflation equal to zero.   We treat imports and exports as exogenous 
given the highly regulated Nazi trade regime. 
In the steady state, the ratio of money (M2) to GDP is set at 40 percent, as this 
was approximately the ratio in the “good years” of 1927-1931 and in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s.  In addition, we place the steady state growth rate of the money supply at 2 
percent to mirror the growth of the economy.  For the war years, we employ INSEE’s 
(1966) retail price index as a measure of inflation.  The estimates of  M2 during the 
occupation are provided by Patat and Lutfalla (1990). 
There are no estimates of the capital stock for the late 1930s.  Carré, Dubois and 
Malinvaud (1975, p. 120) estimate the total capital-output ratio in 1949 to be 3.06 and for   31  31 
productive  capital  1.93,  which  then  slowly  declined  in  the  1950s,  reaching  1.61  by 
1959.
22    For  our  purposes  we  use  a  rough  estimate  of  2  to  provide  an  estimate  of 
productive capital.  However, we do know that the occupation took its toll on capital, just 
as it did on labor.  Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud (1975, p. 534) set the value of gross 
productive capital on average at 56 billion francs in 1956 prices in 1921-1930, 59 billion 
for 1931-1940 and only 15 billion for 1941-1945.
23  
Measurement of the labor force is crucial given its decline during the War.  In 
1938, Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud (1975, p. 59) put the total population of France at 
42.0 million with a labor force of 19.5 million of which 16.4 million were employed in 
productive sectors, which excluded the unemployed, draftees, and government officials.  
During the war, the labor force shrank, but by 1946, it had recovered to 16.8 million, 
although it subsequently declined to 16.4 million by 1957.  Thus the last figure is used as 
the steady state level.  The leisure preference parameters are set equal to values that 
imply that the representative household spent one-third of its time working in steady 
state. 
During the war, the labor force collapsed from its prewar level of 16.4 million.  
The war gradually reduced the labor force.  First, there was the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, 
which had population of 1.9 million (Milward, p. 39).  Assuming the same rate of labor 
force participation as the rest of France in 1938, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine would have 
reduced  the  labor  force  by  0.75  million.
24    Defeat  also  brought  300,000  deaths 
(Bettelheim, 1946) and the initial internment of 1.2 million French prisoners-of-war.  The 
                                                 
22 In 1913, they estimate the capital-output ratio to be 2.81 and the productive capital-output ratio to be 
1.61. 
23 In addition, Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud report (p. 151) an estimate of 137.7 billion current francs for 
fixed reproducible capital in 1913.  Taken with Toutain’s estimate of GDP of 49.6 billion francs for 1913, 
there is an implied capital output ratio of 2.78.   
24 Some of this population also fled or was driven into France as Hitler moved to “Germanize” the region, 
but there are no estimates but it is compensated for by the loss of labor in other small annexed regions.   32  32 
POWs who were called up to duty are assumed to have been previously productive and 
should thus be subtracted from the labor force in 1940, leaving a total of 14.1 million 
workers.  According to Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud (1975) the population continued to 
shrink by perhaps 100,000 per year, and the work force is thus reduced for 1941 and 
1942.  As seen in Table 5, the last great shock was the relève, which occurred in 1943-
1944 and quickly reduced the labor force until Liberation. 
A  critical  parameter  is  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply.    In  most  business  cycle 
models of the U.S. economy, including Ohanian’s model (1997) of the U.S. World War II 
economy, labor elasticity needs to be assumed to be very high in order to mimic the 
observed behavior of labor and output.
25  Thus, we set the labor elasticity to be one. 
However if we assume labor supply to be very elastic and the labor market to be free and 
competitive, there is a boom in Occupied Vichy, contrary to events.  But wages were not 
freely set as wage and price controls plus rationing were imposed at the outset of the war.   
Vichy created controls, but as is often the case with wage and price controls, the drift in 
prices, including uncontrolled goods and the black market, reduced the real wages.  Thus, 
as already described the government raised wages to adjust for the lost of purchasing 
power.  Very broadly this policy might be described as setting a fixed real wage.  To 
estimate the real wage, we use the weighted index of male workers and professionals 
nominal salaries (INSEE, 1966, p. 424).  Indexed by retail prices, these real wages fell 
from 100 in 1939 to 60 in 1944.  Other measures of wages or earnings show very similar 
declines.  This fixed real wage is set by this series during the war, while wages are 
competitively  determined  afterwards.    In  wartime,  workers  were  paid  less  than  their 
                                                 
25 Microeconomic studies estimate low labor supply elasticities and many models implement a Hansen-
Rogerson  model  where  labor  is  indivisible  so  workers  chose  only  between  full  employment  or 
unemployment, providing a high elasticity from the extensive margin of workers moving in and out of the 
work force (Rebelo, 2005).   33  33 
marginal product.  The difference is not assigned to capital but is given back to labor as a 
lump sum rebate.  Although this minimizes the distortion, it produces a drop in the labor 
supply that approximates the observed decline.  In addition, recognizing the fact that 
many workers evaded the controls and obtained a higher real wage because they worked 
in the agricultural sector or in the black market, we allow only 75 percent of the reduction 
in the real wage so that we focus on the wartime equilibrium associated with ￿=0.75.  The 
unwillingness of the French to work, driven partly by patriotic motives and partly by 
below market wage rates, should be captured by this part of the model.   
Up  to  this  point,  we  have  only  considered  wartime  policies  and  not  how  any 
postwar debt and monetary overhangs would be handled.  However, our results require an 
explicit  stabilization  policy,  otherwise  an  immediate  return  to  steady  state  taxation, 
expenditure and inflation policies leaves the debt well above its steady state value and it 
would grow explosively.   The surplus generated in steady state is insufficient to cover 
war-generated interest payments, even with the lower levels of non-interest expenditures. 
Thus, in 1944 the government cannot revert steady state policies because they do not 
produce an equilibrium.  Some postwar stabilization package is required.  Most studies of 
war finance focus only on wartime finance and a separate literature focuses on postwar 
stabilization  policies.      Here,  we  provide  a  more  integrated  approach  that  combines 
wartime and postwar financing, which would have been included in government plans. 
Many  types  of  stabilization  packages  with  different  distributional  effects  were 
possible after the war. Except for pronouncements about safeguarding the franc, Vichy’s 
postwar plans were opaque; though its choices and those of any liberated government 
certainly differed.  Rather than assume that the public knew in 1939 what stabilization 
package would be adopted in addition to knowing all the wartime policies, we take an   34  34 
initial agnostic view and instead calculate what would be the required size of a non-
distortionary stabilization package to move the economy back to its steady state path.
26  
In our exercise above, we calculated the size of the required program by asking what is 
the lump-sum tax needed to reduce the postwar debt to its steady state level.  We picked a 
five year period for the program, and apportioned the lump-sum tax over these years to 
bring the end-of-war debt down to the sustainable debt to GDP level.    
In addition to the debt overhang, a monetary adjustment is also required.  Our 
steady state money to income ratio is 0.40, which is the rate observed in the data in the 
immediate prewar period.  During the war the real money balances rise as a consequence 
of the steady monetary expansion.  To bring real money down to the steady state level we 
impose a deflationary program, consisting of a five year monetary reduction that lowers 
the  real  money  level  to  its  steady  state.    This  program  is  similar  to  the  deflationary 
programs instituted by the British after 1815 and after World War I to put the pound back 
on the gold standard at its prewar parity; and which the French considered but did not 
attempt after World War I (Bordo and Hautcoeur, 2003).   
 
VI. An Assessment of Wartime Finance 
Given  that  money  is  supernuetral,  we  can  first  examine  the  real  side  of  the 
economy in Figure 1.  The choices for the real sector are separable from the portfolio 
decision  of  households  and  the  financing  decision  of  the  government.    We  set  the 
production function parameter A so that steady state output is one.  Thus, in the figures, 
output,  consumption,  investment,  capital,  and  debt  are  presented  relative  to  this 
benchmark.  Labor is set so that the initial supply is equal to one third of a day.   The 
                                                 
26 The length the stabilization period is arbitrary but approximates the post-World War I periods for Britain 
and France, which stabilized in 1925 and 1926.   35  35 
dotted lines represent the steady state growth path for each variable and the starred lines 
the path of the observed variable, where it was available.   
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1 shows the behavior of the real sector with a competitive labor market, 
represented by the dashed line and with a labor market subject to wage and price controls, 
indicated by the solid line.
27  Because of the high labor elasticity in a free labor market, 
                                                 
27As a check for our measure of controlled prices and wages, we computed an index of real labor earnings 
divided by the labor supply, which closely parallels our direct measure of real wages during the war years. 
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the labor supply does not sharply decline like the actual data.  Its downward movement is 
only driven only by higher labor taxes and the relève.  Consequently, output remains 
relatively level.  But, when real wages are controlled, labor supply drops, more closely 
following  the  actual  data.    This  reduction  in  labor  produces  sharper  falls  in  output, 
consumption,  investment  and  capital.    While  this  collapse  is  less  than  the  decline 
officially recorded by the starred lines, the actual data does not include black market 
activity, which would lower the burden.
28  Unfortunately, there are only rough estimates 
of its size.  Sédillot (1985) believed that the volume of illegal transactions were 10 to 30 
percent of the legal market, with a peak in 1943.
29  Reviewing the available evidence, 
Sanders (2001) concluded that the black market averaged 20 percent of GDP.     Its 
inclusion in official data would substantially reduce gap between these numbers and our 
model.   We do not have series for private capital, investment and consumption, but the 
fragmentary data suggests that both seriously shrank over the course of the occupation.  
The model appears to capture the burden of occupation payments, increased in 1943, as 
consumption dips again.  These huge losses seem realistic given what we know happened 
to food rations.  According to Milward (1970), the rations for bread, meat and fat in 
1943-1944 were 70, 18 and 31 percent of the prewar levels.  These were basic necessities 
and consumption of other perishables and durables collapsed.  Although the black market 
helped to supplement these low levels, it did not make up the difference for the whole 
population. 
A key feature of the model is the calculation of the debt level sustainable by the 
steady state parameters of the model.   In the steady state there is a small surplus dictated 
                                                 
28 According to Götz (2000) and Sanders (2001), German soldiers constituted a substantial share of the 
black market, sending purchased goods back to Germany. 
29 At the end of 1942 Pierre Laval informed the German Foreign Minister van Ribbentrop that the black 
market for agricultural and industrial goods represented 15 and 10 percent of all economic activity. 
(Sanders, 2001).    37  37 
by the fact that government expenditure is 10 percent of GDP and the tax rate on all 
factors is 11 percent.  Given these and other parameters, we can compute the steady state 
path of money and the steady state debt such that the present value of future surpluses 
plus seigniorage produces a debt to income level that is stationary.  If actual debt is more 
that  this  ratio,  debt  will  grow  explosively;  and  if  it  is  less,  it  will  implode.    The 
sustainable steady state debt ratio is 0.864.  This value is very close to the pre-World War 
I (1910-1913) ratio of just under 80 percent and the ratio attained after the post-World 
War I stabilization (1929-1930) of 80 percent (Bordo and Hautcoeur, 2003).  Compared 
to our sustainable ratio, the actual ratio is slightly higher for 1939, which reflects the 
relatively poor economic performance of the late 1930s.    Figure 2 displays the asset side 
of the economy, with the rapid rise in real debt and money. 
Figure 2 
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During the war the debt to income ratio and real money climbed as part of the 
efforts of Vichy to finance the war, and our estimated paths for these variables roughly 
followed  their  observed  trajectories.    Their  closeness  is  perhaps  surprising  since  our 
model  has  a  non-distortionary  stabilization  program  in  contrast  to  the  postwar 
inflationary policies.  In these figures, inflation weakly mimics its actual movement, with 
the calibrated average inflation rate below the observed rate.  The average calibrated rate 
for 1939-1944 was 5.1 percent well below the average observed rate of 18.2 percent for 
retail prices.   The differential becomes even larger after 1944 when postwar governments 
resorted to inflation, a feature which will be discussed later. 
How closely does our baseline model approximate the structure of Vichy war 
finance?  Table 6 reports the shares of government revenue derived from taxes, bond 
revenue, and seigniorage for the model depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  The shares generated 
by the model are fairly close to the actual shares.   The primary difference is that actual 
seigniorage was produced by faster inflation and money growth than witnessed in the 
model.   
Table 6 
Actual and Counterfactual Shares of Government Finance 
(percent) 
 
Wartime finance produced a large accumulated debt that required postwar policies 
that would substantially deviate from the steady state.   The five year program of lump 












1940  25  27  44  26  58  16 
1941  30  34  34  35  28  37 
1942  36  26  40  40  16  44 
1943  30  35  37  51  23  26 
1944  30  52  15  33  62  5   39  39 
sum taxes that were needed to bring the end-of-war debt down to the sustainable debt to 
GDP level was equal to 97 percent of steady state GDP.
30   The graph for the debt to 
income ratio in Figure 2 shows the actual data with the starred line and our model’s 
results, including the stabilization, with the solid line.  Although the timing of the rise and 
fall in this ratio is missed, we approximate its movements.  The actual path shows a huge 
fall in the ratio during the politically unstable postwar period, when inflation surged, 
reducing the real value of the debt.  This huge effective default lowered the ratio to 0.53 
in 1950, well below the steady state level of 0.864.   The rise in real money balances is 
roughly tracked in Figure 2, though we have a higher end-of-war level because there is 
less inflation in our model.  We do capture the behavior of velocity, and the higher real 
money combined with lower inflation produces realistic levels of seigniorage reported in 
Table 6.   
We calculate the welfare cost as the additional permanent annual consumption 
that would make up the difference between the wartime consumption and the steady state 
economy over a twenty year period.
31    The total annual cost of the wartime policies 
independent  of  the  stabilization  package  would  have  been  19.96  percent  of 
consumption.
32  The relative costs of the separate policies can be seen in Table 7 for the 
Baseline Model with a non-distortionary stabilization program.   A central question faced 
by the Nazis was whether to deploy French labor in France or in Germany.  They kept a 
large number of soldiers as POWs; and ultimately, they drafted French workers across the 
Rhine.  If all the variables are set at their steady state levels, and only the imposition on 
                                                 
30 It is equal to 124 percent of 1945 GDP, however this year had a very depressed economy in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. 
31 Although we could have chosen an infinite horizon, we selected twenty years instead as representing the 
maximum time horizon of any politician.   
32 These costs will vary with the time horizon.  For five years, the welfare cost was 53.7, for 100 years 8.2, 
and for an infinite time horizon, 7.1 percent.   40  40 
the French economy was the retention of POWs and the labor draft to Germany, the loss 
were be 3.08 percent of consumption. The additional labor would have made a major 
improvement  to  the  productive  capacity  of  the  economy  and  hence  reduced  the  loss.  
Wage and price controls produced a lost of 2.46 percent. By far the largest factor was the 
government spending and occupation payments, which cost the economy 16.27 percent.  
The remaining individual effects are relatively small by comparison.  Money growth has 
the “wrong” sign because calibrated inflation was not sufficient to produce a fall in real 
balances  that  would  lower  utility.    However,  it  should  be  noted  that  real  balances 
increased until 1944, largely a result of financial repression.  The components almost but 
do not add up to the total, reflecting the interaction of these distortions on the economy.   
 
Table 7 
Welfare Cost of Separate Policies 
(percent) 
Loss  Baseline 
Model 
POWs and Labor Draft  3.08 
Wage and Price Controls  2.46 
Government Spending  16.27 
Increased Taxation  1.09 
Net Exports  -0.57 
Money Growth  -1.04 
Total Cost  19.96 
   
Any wartime government had good economic reason to shift the burden over a 
long period of time.   Modern nations rarely use taxes exclusively,  although the  U.S. 
depended  heavily  on  taxation  during  the  Korean  War,  with  a  resulting  high  cost 
(Ohanian, 1997). Vichy used formal and informal regulation to induce individuals and 
institutions to hold more government bonds.  Higher taxes and less borrowing could have 
reduced the size of the postwar adjustment but at a considerable cost.  Vichy’s average 
tax rates during the war for labor and capital peaked at 16 and nearly 60 percent during   41  41 
the war.  If only taxes were increased and the rest of the wartime policies retained, there 
is no set of tax rates that can completely avoid the need for some stabilization, as shown 
in Table 8.   As tax rates increase, the tax base begins to shrink so that total tax revenue 
exhibits a Laffer curve, first increasing and decreasing.  If both factors were taxed at 40 
percent  throughout  the  war,  the  required  stabilization  program  would  have  been  31 
percent of steady state GDP.  At 50 percent, it would have been 15 percent, with the 
minimal stabilization program occurring at 57 percent tax rates, yielding 11 percent of 
steady state GDP; after this point the size of the postwar program and the welfare cost 
climb.  The reason why heavier wartime taxation was not adopted is obvious: the welfare 
cost is 30.7 percent of consumption or a 50 percent addition to the wartime costs of 19.9 
percent. 
Table 8 
Higher Wartime Taxes 
 
Tax Rates on Labor and Capital  20  30  40  50  57  60  70 
Size of Stabilization 
(relative to Steady State GDP) 
1.01  0.60  0.31  0.15  .11  0.12  0.24 
Welfare Cost (20 years)  20.1  21.8  24.3  27.7  30.7  32.2  38.3 
 
What we have produced is a fairly close replication of the behavior of the French 
economy under German occupation.  The cost borne by France was extraordinarily high; 
and to these wartime costs must be added the cost of a stabilization policy that would 
return the economy to its stationary debt to GDP ratio.  The natural question is how 
Vichy intended to manage this burden and what were the choices faced by the post-1944 
governments.   
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VII. Postwar Stabilization 
Before  examining  the  issue  of  postwar  stabilization,  the  question  of  what  the 
public and policy makers expected at the outset of occupation needs to be addressed 
given  that  we  are  employing  a  perfect  foresight  model  but  are  dealing  with  the 
uncertainties of war.  Most historical accounts agree that in 1940, defeated France was 
demoralized and accepted the apparent new European order.  A reasonable assumption is 
that they believed that Germany would “win” by the end of 1942.  Evidence from the 
Vichy  bond  market  (Oosterlinck,  2003)  reveals  that  the  investing  public  apparently 
accepted that Hitler would be victorious.  Until early 1943, the 3 percent rentes issued by 
the Third Republic and bonds of comparable maturity issued by Vichy traded at similar 
prices; when the possibility of defeat and potential repudiation of Vichy debt arose later, 
a premium was commanded by the older rentes, which any government of Liberation was 
more certain to honor.  Furthermore, up until the end of 1942, total short and medium 
term debt was less than half of total debt.  The government appeared to be confident that 
it could sell long-term debt at low nominal yields.  After this time, shorter term debt 
became more important than long term debt and stood at 60 percent of all debt by August 
1944 (Mitzakis, 1945).  Thus, it appears that until early 1943, the public believed that 
Hitler would succeed, conquering the Russians and obtaining a peace treaty from Britain.   
Even with this favorable scenario, which assumes that German demands on the 
French economy ceased with victory at the end of 1942, there is a huge postwar burden.  
Figure 3 shows the asset markets’ predicted behavior for this shorter war.  The welfare 
cost of the war ending in 1942 is lower, the equivalent of a 12.85 percent twenty year 
annual reduction in consumption, an improvement over the 19.96 percent cost for the 
four  year war but still very high.  However, the size of the requisite five year fiscal   43  43 
stabilization package would be 88 percent of steady state GDP, not much lower than the 
97 percent for the four year war.   In terms of financing the shorter war, the patterns of 
debt to GDP and real money in Figure 3 more closely match the magnitude and timing of 
the actual paths of these variables, suggesting that the public believed this be the actual 
outcome, only to be surprised later.  Nevertheless, Vichy was unable to significantly 
reduce its postwar burden during a shorter war because the model predicts that it would 
continue to rely  on debt finance.   In the  years 1940-1942, 57, 26 and 59 percent of 
expenditures  would  have  been  financed  by  debt  producing  the  need  for  a  large 
stabilization package.  
Figure 3 
 
Given the apparent inability of escaping from the heavy postwar burden with a 
shorter war, we will focus our analysis on the four year war model to address the question 
of how the postwar debt and money overhang would have been handled by Vichy and the   44  44 
governments of Liberated France.   In Nazi Europe, Vichy France would have remained a 
vassal  state.    We  assume  that  at  the  war’s  conclusion  in  1944,  occupation  payments 
ceased.  Trade would have been very limited and the debt would have been managed 
internally  without  access  to  external  capital  markets.    Debt  and  monetary  overhangs 
would have been eliminated by running budget surpluses.  In essence, we assume that 
Vichy followed a very nineteenth century remedy of raising taxes over a long period in 
order to slowly pay down the debt to its steady state level. The various tax policies are 
shown in Table 9, starting with 11 percent, the steady state rate.   Moving back to tax 
rates of 11 percent in 1945 would have caused the requisite stabilization package explode 
to 372 percent of steady state GDP after 20 years.  The welfare cost remains the same 
because  the  stabilization  of  this  vast  sum  is  carried  out  with  a  non-distortionary  tax.  
Raising tax rates to 20 percent would still leave a large stabilization after twenty years; 
but at 30 percent tax rates for two decades, the debt would be reduced to its steady state 
level.      The  total  welfare  cost  of  this  potential  policy  is  26.9  percent  of  annual 
consumption,  with  the  cost  of  the  wartime  policies  representing  19.9  percent  and 
stabilization an additional 7.0 percent of consumption.  While this is a substantial loss, it 
is significantly less than the consumption loss that would have been incurred if wartime 
tax rates had been increased to their maximum.   
    
Table 9 







20 Year Tax Rates on  
Labor and Capital 
11  20  30  40 
Size of Stabilization 
(relative to GDP) 
3.72  1.65  -0.03  -1.12 
Welfare Cost   19.9  22.5  26.9  32.9   45  45 
Post-World War II tax rates were, in fact, dramatically higher on labor and capital 
than in the Belle Epoque or the best years of the Interwar period.  In 1947, the tax rates 
were 22 and 20 percent; and by 1950 they were 31 percent on labor and 27 percent on 
capital.   These would have been sufficient to finance the accumulated debt except that 
government expenditure was much higher than the steady state and represented more than 
30 percent of GDP by 1950.  Not only were there higher expenditures derived from the 
war, but the modern welfare state was expanding. No surplus was generated until 1959; 
higher revenues covered higher current expenditures.  Our model of Vichy’s behavior 
treats it as a backward-looking regime that would not have embraced the modern welfare 
state. 
The  stabilization  policies  of  liberated  France  followed  a  very  different  path.  
Immediately  after the war, the government became heavily dependent on inflationary 
finance (Eichengreen and Casella, 1994).   The government briefly tried to halt rising 
inflation  with  price  controls  in  1947,  but  shortages  and  an  expanding  black  market 
brought it to an end.  At the beginning of 1948, the government imposed a one-time tax 
on  monetary  assets  that  raised  150  billion  francs,  put  credit  controls  in  place,  cut 
expenditures, and impounded all 5,000 franc notes to punish the black market (yielding 
300 billion francs).  While these actions temporarily held inflation in check by providing 
the Treasury with revenue and reducing the money stock, inflation rose rapidly in the 
second  half  of  the  year.    Inflation,  which  ranged  between  40  and  60  percent  in  the 
immediate postwar years, was then brought down to 1.4 percent in 1949 and 2 percent in 
1950.   The brief but very rapid postwar inflation contributed to the reduction of the debt 
overhang.  From 181 percent of GDP in 1944, debt fell to 65 percent in 1947 and 51 
percent by 1950.   46  46 
The Marshall Plan was another factor contributing to stabilization.  Between April 
1948 and March 1952, the U.S. provided France with $2.4 billion of European Recovery 
Program funds under the Marshall Plan.    This funding equaled 11 percent of France’s 
1948 GDP, and it financed about a quarter of the French budget deficit in 1948 and half 
in 1949.   The Marshal Plan funds were given in the form of grants of goods and services, 
conditional on the recipient countries presentation of acceptable budgets and programs.  
The French government then sold the imported goods to domestic business in exchange 
for francs. According to Casella and Eichengreen (1994), the Marshall Plan funds were 
most important for solving the distributional conflicts and securing agreement among the 
parties in the French government.  The Marshall Plan assisted with the financing of the 
balance of payments deficit, which had been covered by substantial foreign credits.   In 
1944 and 1945, Switzerland and Britain provided trade credits as did the Export-Import 
Bank for a total of $550 million.  In the next two years, France financed about half of its 
trade deficit by exhausting its gold and foreign exchange reserves and by requisitioning 
French-held  foreign  securities.    The  American  Treasury  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the 
governments  of  Canada  and  New  Zealand,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the 
World Bank provided the remainder, for a total of nearly 7 percent of French GNP (Patat 
and Lutfalla, 1990).  Arriving in late 1948, the Marshall Plan may have helped to close 
the budget deficit and eliminate the need for the government to go to the Banque de 
France for advances, but it seems less likely to have contributed to the drop in the debt to 
GDP ratio, which had fallen to 45 percent in that year from 247 percent in 1945.
33 
To measure the cost of actual postwar policies, we examine the results of French 
policies before and after the Marshall Plan, dividing the immediate postwar period into 
                                                 
33 In a simple calculation, if there were no growth or Marshall Plan, inflation alone would have reduced the 
debt to GDP ratio to 102 percent by 1948; growth alone with no inflation or Marshall Plan would lowered 
the ratio to 162 percent, while the Marshall Plan produced a 3 percent decline.   47  47 
1945-1947 and 1948-1951.    Table 10 explores the postwar policies, with the baseline 
model providing the measure of wartime costs.  Although there were brief periods of 
controls, we assume that markets became free following the demise of the wartime wage 
and price controls and the return of drafted labor; and we use the observed tax rates, 
government expenditures, money growth, and net exports to examine the welfare costs.  
By the end of 1947, before the Marshall Plan took effect, the total welfare cost of 
wartime policies and stabilization shows a decline from 19.96 to 16.03 percent---not an 
increase as Vichy tax policy would have produced.  Higher taxes added to the cost, but 
money growth and net exports reduced it.  Money growth in our model does not generate 
enough inflation to reduce real balances, which would generate additional costs.  For 
purposes of this discussion we treat postwar inflation as unexpected, thus approximating 
a lump sum tax with no augmentation of the welfare cost.  More importantly, even in the 
absence of this factor, total welfare cost would have declined because of net exports.  The 
international trade credits, described above, permitted France to run a huge trade deficit.  
For  simplicity  in  this  calculation,  we  treat  these  long-term,  low-interest 
intergovernmental  credits  as  gifts,  giving  a  slight  upward  bias  to  our  estimate of  the 
benefit.  The next column, where there were no trade credits and France would have been 
forced to balance trade after the war, shows that the trade credits improve welfare by 
about four percent by 1947.    The debt to GDP ratio had been reduced by inflation to 45 
percent; and what effectively was accomplished was the substitution of domestic debt for 
some foreign debt that eased the consumption constraint, moving government finance 
closer to the optimum where foreign transfers would have been financed by long-term 
foreign borrowing. 
















POWs and Relève  3.08  3.08 3.08  3.08 3.08  3.08
Wage and Price Controls  2.46  2.46 2.46  2.46 2.46  2.46
Government Spending  16.27  16.27 16.27  16.27 16.27  16.27
Increased Taxation  1.09  1.59 1.59  2.35 2.35  2.35
Net Exports  -0.57  -4.72 -0.57  -5.69 -0.57  -4.99
Money Growth  -1.04  -1.77 -1.77  -2.89 -2.89  -2.89
Total Cost  19.96  16.03 19.90  14.96 19.71  15.56
 
Considering  the  whole  of  the  stabilization  period  to  the  end  of  1951  when 
inflation ceased and the Marshall Plan was completed, there is some higher welfare cost 
from increased taxation, but it is overwhelmed by the higher net imports financed by 
more trade credits and American aid, reducing the welfare cost by 5.12 percent (5.69 – 
0.57).  The last column shows only trade credits and no Marshall Plan and reveals that the 
program lowered the consumption loss by about half a percent (5.69-4.99), a fraction of 
the benefit from the trade credits.   Again, the acceptance of foreign debt to overcome the 
consumption loss derived from the transfers to Germany represented a welfare-improving 
policy.   
  Not only did the policies of liberated France appear to lower the costs of German 
exactions, but they also had radically different distributional consequences.  The struggle 
over how to balance the budget and ensuing inflation appears to have costly as it pushed 
the debt to GDP ratio below the steady state level of 86.4 percent of GDP.  The inflation 
produced capital losses for the owners of government debt.  Although apparently little is 
known about the ownership of the debt, among the largest holders of debt were the banks 
and other financial institutions, who under the regime of financial repression had been 
induced  to  expand  their  bond  holdings.    In  1939,  the  largest  deposit  bank,  Crédit   49  49 
Lyonnais held 44 percent of its investments and 18 percent of its assets in short term bons 
de la défense nationale.   By 1942, these bonds accounted for 85 percent of its portfolio 
and 37 percent of its assets (Plessis and Verheyde, 2003).  Part of this expansion of bond 
holdings by the banks was facilitated by issues of new shares, which in the case of  Crédit 
Lyonnais more than doubled its capital but left ts capital to asset ratio hovering below 5 
percent.  The post-inflation market values of the debt would have threatened the solvency 
of these institutions.  In this light, the 1945 nationalization of the four largest deposit 
banks  appears  to  have  been  dictated  by  insolvency,  rather  than  the  hostility  of  the 
government, which saw the banks as passive collaborators.   
 
VIII. Conclusion 
  When France fell to the advancing forces of the Third Reich, there was a moral 
collapse that facilitated the installation of the collaborationist Pétain regime.  Resistance 
to this new government was weak, reflecting the general belief that a new order had 
emerged  in  Europe.    Although  under  occupation,  Vichy’s  methods  of  financing  the 
unprecedented  German  demands  closely  resembled  “ordinary”  war  finance  by 
belligerents.  Under even the most optimistic scenario where the war ended in 1942 and 
there was an immediate termination of occupation costs, the financing of the transfers to 
the Nazis imposed a welfare cost equal to a 12.6 percent reduction of consumption for 
twenty years plus the cost of financing a debt overhang equal to 88 percent of steady state 
GDP.   Actual financing costs in our model left a 19.9 percent reduction in consumption; 
where the payments directly accounted for 16.7 percent of the cost, followed next in 
importance by the retention in Germany of POWs and the labor draft.  The full four years 
of war left a debt overhang of 97 percent of GDP.      50  50 
Assuming  that  Vichy’s  postwar  plans  would  have  followed  its  traditionalist 
pattern,  a  budget  surplus  generated  by  higher  taxes  could  have  eliminated  the  debt 
overhang in twenty years at an additional cost of 7 percent of consumption.  Tax rates did 
actually rise to the requisite levels, but the necessary surplus never appeared because the 
budget was swollen by reconstruction expenditures and higher peacetime expenditures 
associated with the nascent welfare state. It is not a great stretch to imagine that the 
repressive Vichy regime could have managed to raise taxes to rein in the debt if there had 
been  victory  in  1942,  but  the  divisive  democracy  that  emerged  could  not.    When  a 
budgetary struggle arose after Liberation, the rapid and probably unexpected inflation of 
1946-1948 reduced the debt below its estimated steady state level.  Yet, if inflation was 
largely unexpected, then inflation was relatively low cost with the burden of adjustment 
falling heavily on those---financial institutions and individuals---who had been induced to 
buy  Vichy’s  bonds.      This  inflation-default  was  not  selective,  culling  out  Vichy’s 
supporters, but hit all who had willingly or otherwise propped up the collaborationist 
government.  Finally, the cost of stabilization was lowered by the fact that France had 
regained access to international capital and could borrow on favorable terms to finance 
consumption in the critical years of reconstruction that preceded the miracle  years of 
growth.      51  51 
Bibliography 
 
Arnoult, Pierre, "Les finances de la France",in La France sous l’occupation  (Paris : 
Presses Universitaires de France, Collection Esprit de la Résistance, 1959), pp.39-56 
 
Banque de France, Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires, Compte Rendu, Paris 
(Imprimerie Paul Dupont, various years). 
 
Barro, Robert J., “Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices and Budget Deficits in 
the United Kingdom,” Journal of Monetary Economics 20 (1987), pp. 221-248. 
 
Barro, Robert J., “The Neoclassical Approach to Fiscal Policy,” in Robert J. Barro, ed., 
Modern Business Cycle Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 236-
264. 
 
Bouthillier, Yves, Le drame de Vichy (2 volumes), (Paris, Plon, 1951). 
 
Bordo,  Michael,  Dominique  Simard  and  Eugene  N.  White,  "France  and  the  Bretton 
Woods International Monetary System 1960 to 1968," in Jaime Reis, ed.,  International 
Monetary Systems in Historical Perspective (St. Martins Press, New York, 1995). 
 
Bettelheim, Charles, Bilan de l’économie française, 1919-1946 (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1947. 
 
Carré, J.-J., P. Dubois and E. Malinvaud, French Economic Growth (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1975). 
 
Cathala, Pierre, Face aux réalités. La direction des finances françaises sous l’occupation, 
(Paris, Editions du Triolet, 1948).  
 
Cohen, Daniel, “How to evaluate the solvency of an indebted nation”, Economic Policy 
16 (1985), pp. 140-167. 
 
Dormais, Jean-Pierre, The French Economy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
Du Parquet, L, “Le financement français de la première guerre mondiale,” Comité pour 
l’Histoire Economique et Financière de la France, Histoire des Marchés Financiers (Paris, 
forthcoming 2006).  
 
Ferguson, Niall, The Pity of War (Great Britain: Penguin Press, 1998). 
 
Fisk, Harvey E., French Public Finance in the Great War and Today (New York: Bankers 
Trust Company, 1922). 
 
France. Archives Nationales (Paris). Fonds AJ40, (1939-1945), Vol. 832. 
   52  52 
Friedman, Milton, “Price, Income and Monetary Changes in Three Wartime Periods,” 
American Economic Review 42 (May 1952). 
 
Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1864-
1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
 
Goldin, Claudia D., “War” in Glann Porter, ed., Encyclopedia of American Economic 
History Vol. III, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1980), pp. 935-957.  
 
Götz, Aly, The Final Solution: The Nazi Population Problem and the Murder of the Jews 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
Herbert, Ulrich, Hitler’s foreign workers. Enforced labor in Germany under the Third 
Reich, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), Annuaire 
Statistique de la France  Résumé Rétrospectif (Paris, 1966). 
 
Les Institutions de la France nouvelle, V Finances et droit fiscal (juillet 1940 mars 1942), 
(Paris : Société d’éditions économiques et sociales, 1942). 
 
Klug, Adam, “The Theory and Practice of Reparations and American Loans to Germany, 
1925-1929,” (Princeton: Working Papers in International Economics, G-90-03, 
International Finance Section, 1990). 
 
Liberman, Peter, Does Conquest Pay? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
 
Ljunqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent, Recursive Macroeconomic Theory 2
nd ed., 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) 
 
McGrattan, Ellen R. and Lee E. Ohanian, “Does Neoclassical Theory Accout for the 
Effects of Big Fiscal Shocks? Evidence from World War II” (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report 315), January 2003. 
 
Makinen, Gail E., and G. Thomas Woodward, “Funding crises in the aftermath of World 
War I,” in Rudiger Dornbush and Mario Draghi, Public debt management: theory and 
history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, “The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage: Theory and Evidence,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics (1987), 20, pp. 327-41. 
 
Margairaz, Michel, and Bloch-Lainé, François, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie histoire 
d’une conversion 1932-1952 (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de 
la France, 1991). 
 
Margairaz, Michel, “La Banque de France et l’Occupation,” in Michel Margairaz, ed., 
Banques, Banque de France et Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002), 
pp-15-37-84.   53  53 
 
 
Merigot, J-G. and Coulbois P., Le Franc, 1938-1950 (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence, 1950). 
 
Milward, Alan S., The New Order and the French Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970). 
 
Mitzakis Michel, Principaux aspects de l’évolution financière de la France 1936-1944, 
Paris, Les Publications Techniques, 1945). 
 
Neal, Larry, “The Economics and Finance of Bilateral Clearing Agreements: Germany, 
1934-8,” Economic History Review Second Series, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (August 1979), 
pp. 391-404. 
 
Nogaro, Bertrand, Le financement des dépenses publiques et la liquidation des dépenses 
de guerre (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1945). 
 
Obstfeld, M and Rogoff, K., “The intertemporal approach to the current account,” in G. 
M. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds., Handbook of International Economics Vol. III. (New 
York: Elsevier, 1995). 
 
Ohanian, Lee E., “The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the United States: 
World War II and the Korean War,” American Economic Review 87, 1 (March 1997), 
pp. 23-40.  
 
Oosterlinck, K. “The Bond Market and the Legitimacy of Vichy France,” Explorations in 
Economic History 40:3 (2003), pp. 327-345. 
 
Patat, Jean-Pierre and Michel Lutfalla, A Monetary History of France in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990). 
 
Piketty, Thomas, “Income Inequality in France, 1901-98,” Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 2876 (July 2001). 
 
Piketty, Thomas, Les hauts revenus en France au XX
e siècle: Inégalités et redistributions, 
1901-1998 (Paris, Editions Grasset, 2001). 
 
Plessis, Alain, “Les grandes banques dépôts et l’Occupation,” in Michel Margairaz, ed., 
Banques, Banque de France et Seconde Guerre Mondiale  (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002), 
pp-15-36. 
 
Plessis, Alain and Philippe Verheyde, “Le Crédit lyonnais sous l’Occupation,” in Bernard 
Desjardins, Le Crédit Lyonnais (Geneva : Droz, 2003, pp. 889-951.  
 
Rebelo, Sergio, « Real Business Cycle Models : Past, Present, and Future, » (NBER 
Working Paper 11401, June 2005). 
   54  54 
Rockoff, Hugh, “Prices and Wage Controls in Four Wartime Periods,” Journal of 
Economic History 41, 2 (June 1981), pp. 381-401. 
 
Sanders, Paul, Histoire du marché noir 1940-1946, (Paris, Perrin, 2001). 
 
Schuker, Stephen A, American ‘reparations’ to Germany 1919-1933: implications for the 
Third-World debt crisis, (Princeton: Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 61, 
1988). 
 
Sédillot, René, Histoire des marchés noirs (Paris: Tallandier, 1985). 
 
Toutain, Jean-Claude, “Le produit intérieur brut de la France, 1789-1990,” Economies et 
Sociétés, Histoire économique quantitative, Série HBQ (1997), pp. 5-136. 
 
Walsh, Carl E., Monetary Theory and Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003). 
 
White, Eugene N., “Making the French pay: The costs and consequences of the 
Napoleonic reparations,” European Review of Economic History 5 (2001), pp. 337-365. 